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NomS
CREATION OF A TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY WITHOUT
THE USE OF A STRAWMAN
What does a lawyer do for his client who wishes to create a tenancy
by the entirety' in real property which he now separately owns? To many
lawyers the answer seems apparent-have the husband deed the land to
some strawman (his secretary) who in turn will convey it back to the
client and his wife as tenants by the entirety. But to other lawyers this
method seems cumbersome. They prefer to eliminate the deed to and from
the strawman. Instead, they have their client convey the property directly
to himself and his wife as tenants by the entireties. However, because of
the lack of law on this subject in Wyoming, the impatient lawyer who
uses this latter method must always concern -himself over such things aswill other lawyers accept this in their abstract examinations or will it
create an estate valid enough to escape the individual creditors of either
spouse? Certainly this concern is not unjustified. Estates by entireties
are being used more and more, 2 not only because of their immunity from
the creditors of individual spouses, but also because of the ease in sidestepping the probate statute (with its inheritance tax) and avoiding the
expense of a will. Anything the well-meaning lawyer may do to defeat
such aims becomes an injustice to the client as well as to his own reputation. It therefore, will be the object of this note to examine the common
law rules on this subject, the general trends in other states, and then the
Wyoming case and statutory law. Finally, an attempt will be made to
reconcile the Wyoming law with these trends and to affix Wyoming's
position.
Under old English Common Law, in order to impose the right of
survivorship upon jointly-owned property, the Doctrine of Unities developed. It was necessary that the joint owners derived their interests at
the same time and from the same instrument. It was also required that
their interests were co-extensive in duration and entitled them to ownership
of the whole. 3 Additionally, in the case of a tenancy by the entirety, it
was necessary that a valid marriage be in existence. 4 If any of these elements were lacking, tenancy in common resulted. 5 Under this latter
form of ownership, each would own only an undivided part of the whole
instead of each owning the whole itself. This, in turn, meant that there
could be no survivorship if one of the tenants died.6 Such technicalities
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

A tenancy by the entirety can be created in the following states: Arkansas, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri. New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming. Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties,
25 Temp. L.Q. 24 (1951).
See Article, 9 Ark. L. Rev. 330 (1955).
Peters v. Dona, 49 Wyo. 306, 54 P.2d 817 (1936); Burby, Real Property 185 et. seq.
(2d ed. 1953).
Id.
Hammond v. McArthur, 30 Cal.2d 512, 183 P.2d 1 (1947).
Burby, Real Property § 196 (2d ed. 1953).
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resulted in a subterfuge. The grantor would convey his interest to a
trusted third party who then would deed the premises back to him and
his wife. Thus the unities were satisfied. 7 Each owned the whole and
survivorship resulted when one of the joint tenants died.
With the adoption of the common law in our states, the Unities
Doctrine traveled to the United States." Here the mobility of our society
caused a great increase in the alienation of property. Furthermore, women
came to be regarded as responsible property owners. The necessary result
was strife. One side was the grantor wishing to give his wife a present
interest in his property. On the other was feudal inflexibility. Some
courts, in order to give as much effect as possible to his intent, began to
look for a more practical interpretation of the unities. Others chose to
disregard them altogether. Still others continued to hold rigidly to the
feudal concept and to disregard the grantor's wishes. The result was a
three-way split.
The most rigid view held that the grantor's attempt to convey to
himself and his wife rendered the conveyance only partially effective. 9
Since one could not convey to himself at common law, the courts reasoned
that the grantor was incapabale of receiving any interest as a grantee. 10
But, because he clearly intended by the grant in the deed to convey all his
interest in the realty, and because his wife was the only capable grantee,
she became sole owner of the land.'" Thus the -husband became even
more generous than had originally intended.
Less inequitable but equally oblivious of the grantor's intent was
the second view.12 There the tenor of the deed was not so strictly construed. The courts held that while one may not convey to himself, he
should be held to have parted with only partial ownership. Under this
outlook, his wife received an undivided half interest and became merely
a tenant in common with no right of survivorship. This was so because
she took her interest at a different time and from a different instrument
than her husband.
With the idea that the intent of the grantor should be given effect,
the New York courts generated a more modern theory. 3 Here, they
reasoned, was a conveyance to a husband and wife. Under common law,
the husband and wife were considered a distinct entity. True, the Married
Women's Acts had removed any common law restraint on the wife's ability
to receive and convey property separate and apart from her husband, but
7.

See Howell v.

Vieas, 232 Mich. 227, 205 N.W. 55 (1925).

8.

§ 8-17, W.S. 1957.

9.

Cameron v. Steves, 9 New. Br. 141 (1858).

10.

Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Il. 437, 163 N.E. 327 (1928).

11.
12.
13.

See Wright v. Knapp, 183 Mich. 656, 150 N.W. 315 (1915).
Michigan State Bank v. Kern, 189 Mich. 467, 155 N.W. 502 (1915).
In re Klatzl's Estate, 216 N.Y. 83, 110 N.E. 181, reargurnent denied, 218 N.Y. 734,
113 N.E. 406 (1915), Judge Collin's opinion; Boehringer v. Schmid, 133 Misc. 236,
232 N.Y.S. 360, aff'd without op., 238 App. Div..881, 239 N.Y.S. 922 (1930), aff'd
per curiam op., 254 N.Y. 355, 173 N.E. 220.
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had these laws also destroyed the marriage entity of husband wife? New
York said, "No." With this basis they then held that a husband in
conveying to himself and his wife is not really conveying to two individuals.
He is instead conveying to the marriage entity. It is as members of this
entity that husband and wife derive their interests. Such reasoning allowed
the coutr to comply with the unities requirement and yet to give effect to
the grantor's intention.

14
Other states followed suit.

This theory was still subservient to the unities requirement. Other
courts, rather than strain to fit two people into one mold, decided to
ignore the unities altogether. If the husband wanted his property in
the joint ownership of himself and his wife, his desire was paramount.
15
All he needed to do was express his intent in the instrument.
Also significant were the developments in giving effect to the grantor's
intent in the field of joint tenancies. As one might expect, New York
again took the lead.16 Without the marriage entity to rely on, the New
York courts had to look to the estate itself. They reasoned that when one
conveys all his property to himself and another as joint tenants, he, in
effect, erases his former estate in the property and creates a new estate in
the property-one of joint ownership. From this conveyance .he derives
his interest as a joint tenant at the same time and from the same instrument as the other joint tenant or tenants. In other words, they all take
their interests as joint tenants at the same instant. Again the unities are
satisfied and the grantor's intent is carried out. Thus it is evident that
the mere presence of the marriage entity which converts the joint tenancy
into a tenancy by the entirety, should not preclude application of this
theory to a tenancy by the entirety. 17
With such a variety of theories from which to choose, the question
becomes which are most applicable to Wyoming's situation. In order to
arrive at a conclusion, an examination of the sparse Wyoming law on this
subject is necessary.
In the cases of Peters v. Dona1 8 and Terry v. Hensen,19 the Wyoming
State Supreme Court recognized that a tenancy by the entirety had been
created because all of the necessary unities were present-including the
marriage entity. This entity was stressed heavily, with the court rejecting
any contention that it had been destroyed by the Wyoming Married
Women's Acts. 2 0
14.

15.
•
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

The court

explained

that

these

acts had removed

Ebrite v. Brookyser, 219 Ark. 676, 244 S.W.2d 625 (1951) ; Johnson v. Landefeld, 138
Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939); Cadgene v. Cadgene, 17 N.J. Misc. 332, 8 A.2d 858,
aff'd on op. below, 124 N.J.L. 566, 12 A.2d 635 (1939); Wollard v. Smith, 244 N. C.
489, 94 S.E.2d 466 (1956).
266 S.W.2d 737 (1954); Therrien v. Therrien,
Creek v. Union Nat. Bank, ____Mo.
94 N. H. 66, 46 A.2d 538 (1946).
Colson v. Baker, 42 Misc. 407, 87 N.Y.S. 238 (1904).
See also, Brown v. Jackson, 35 N.M. 604, 4 P.2d 1081 (1931) ; Lang v. Wilmer, 131
Md. 215, 101 At. 706 (1917).
Peters v. Dona, 49 Wyo. 306, 54 P.2d 817 (1936).
75 Wyo. 444, 297 P.2d 213 (1956).
§§ 20-22 et. seq., W.S. 1957.
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only the restraints on the power of a women to convey and receive property
in her own right. They had not destroyed the marriage entity which was
necessary to create the tenancy.
Concerning the weight to be given the grantor's desires, the Wyoming
Supreme Court, in substance, has indicated there is a presumption that
any conveyance to unmarried persons will be deemed a tenancy in common,
but it is possible for the grantor to create a joint tenancy if he expresses
his intent in the deed. 2' Similarly, a conveyance to a married couple will
be deemed to result in a tenancy by the entirety unless there is again this
appropriate expression of intention. 22 All of this can be taken as meaning
that the court believes the intent of the grantor should prevail, if he will
just express it in the deed. 23 This obiviously is not obstructed by Wyo24
ming's allowance of transfers between spouses.
With these considerations in mind, it is pactical to conclude that
Wyoming, by subjecting itself to the Unities Doctrine, by recognizing the
marriage entity and by attempting to carry out the intent of the grantor
has created a compatible environment for both of the New York views.
Wyoming either can hold that the unities are satisfied by conveying to the
separate marriage entity or it can hold that a new estate has been created
in which the husband and wife derive the same interest at the same
instant. Both avoid the need for a strawman.
There is still another way whereby the desires of the grantor can be
given effect. That, of course, is by statute. Other states, such as Tennessee,25 have passed legislation allowing people to create joint estates
in themselves and others with the incident of survivorship. Needless to
say, such a statute is needed in Wyoming.
However, the present absence of any tangible law in this subject in
Wyoming should serve as a warning to the prudent lawyer to use the
strawman technique. By doing this he will assure his client effective
JAMES BIRCHY
joint ownership and himself peace of mind.
21.

See, Binning v. Miller, 55 Wyo. 478, 102 P.2d 64, rehearing denied, 56 Wyo. 129,
105 P.2d 278; Edwards v. Willson, 30 Wyo. 275, 219 Pac. 233 (1923) ; see 3 Wyo. L.J.
66 (

22.
23.
24.

25.

).

Peters v. Dona, 49 Wyo. 306, 54 P.2d 817 (1936); Amick v. Elwood, 77 Wyo. 264,
314 P.2d 944 (1957).
Balch v. Arnold, 9 Wyo. 17, 59 Pac. 434 (1899); Sharples Corporation v. Sinclair
Wyoming Oil Co., 62 Wyo. 341, 168 P.2d 565, rehearing denied, 62 Wyo. 370,
168 P.2d 565 (1946).....
Arp. v. Jacobs, 3 Wyo. 489, 27 Pac. 800 (1891); In § 34-53, W.S. 1957, where it is
stated that conveyances and encumbrances of homesteads are void unless the spouse
joins, the following language appears: "The foregoing provisions shall not be
applicable to nor shall compliance therewith be required for full legal effectiveness
of any conveyance of property directly from Husband to Wife."
Tenn. Code Ann. § 64-109 (1955): "Any married person owning property or any
interest therein in his or her own name, desiring to convert his or her interest
in such property, into an estate by the entireties with his or her spouse,
may do so by direct conveyance to such spouse by an instrument of conveyance
which shall provide that it is the grantor's intention by such instrument to create
an estate by the entireties in and to the entire interest in such property previously
held by the grantor," Massachusetts, Michigan and Oregon are states which also
have statutes allowing such transfers.

